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Comments
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUCTION
We read in the papers that a St. Paul woman has been freed of
her marital bonds because her husband trained the family dog to
bite her. Or that an undertaker in California has been similarly
liberated because his wife made him sleep in his hearse. Or that
spouses are considered compatible in Hollywood if they can agree
on the size of the alimony. Or that a Nevada divorce obtained by
a District of Columbia couple has been rejected in the District of
Columbia because the spouses had a merry time together in Reno
while the divorce was pending, and the District of Columbia court
felt that, whatever the liberality of the Nevada practice, parties to
a cause of divorce could not 'litigate by day and copulate by night,
inter sese and pendente lite'.1
The above incidents may seem humorous, however in the calendar
year of 1968 an estimated 537,000 divorces took place in the United
States.2 In many of these divorces the respective future rights and respon-
sibilities of the parties were fixed in a written agreement known as the
"Separation Agreement." The purpose of this comment is to present the
practical problems encountered in Missouri in the use of such agreements
and to suggest possible solutions for them.
In the absence of an agreement respecting the future responsibilities
of the parties, the court's authority in such matters is limited. According
to section 452.070, RSMo 1969, the court can grant a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance and pursuant to such decree it may award alimony,
custody of the children, support for the children, attorney's fees, and
court costs.3 Specific personal property may only be decreed to the wife in
a divorce suit pursuant to an agreement of the parties.4 In Bishop v. Bishop,
the court stated that, in the absence of an agreement, it has no authority
"to adjudicate a settlement of property rights, or to divest the title to
property, real or personal out of one party and vest it in the other."5
Also, a valid separation agreement can limit the court's authority in the
disposition of alimony.5 Therefore, a separation agreement can serve a
1. A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTI-NUPTIAL CONTRAcrs V.
(1964).
2. Statistics on Marriage and Divorce, 3 FAMILY L. Q. 46 (1969).
3. § 452.070, RSMo 1969.
4. Landau v. Landau, 71 S.W.2d 49 (St. L. Mo. App. 1934).
5. 151 S.W.2d 553, 556 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941). But see Lane v. Lane, 439
S.W.2d 550 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969). Although not the issue on appeal, the trial
court was permitted to order the transfer of property so that each spouse would
own one-half of the total value of the property. The transfer was allowed
because the wife's petition characterized the action as an equitable accounting.
6. North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936).
(3W0)
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very useful purpose and, in effect, either broaden or restrict the court's
authority.
H. VALDITY
In order to be considered valid, the separation agreement must meet
certain standards. It must fulfill general contract requirements such as
presence of consideration and competence of parties.7 In addition, it must
be free from fraud,8 collusion,9 or compulsion,o and be fair to the
wife."' However, even if the above standards are satisfied, a resumption
of marital relations will terminate a valid separation agreement.' 2
A. Collusion
For a contract to be considered collusive, hence against public policy,
it must promote a breakdown of the marriage relationship. It has been
held that if the agreement provides for the non-defense of a divorce suit,
the Missouri courts will declare it void as against public policy.' 3 However,
insofar as the agreement merely recognizes as an existing fact that a divorce
or separation will soon follow and upon this premise provides for the
maintenance of the wife, it is valid and enforceable.' 4
In Murray v. Murray,15 although not actually expressed in the agree-
ment, the court found that the understanding of the parties was that the
husband would obtain a divorce and the wife would not contest the action.
The court based its conclusion upon the testimony of the wife, who at the
trial attacked the validity of the property settlement. She admitted that
she signed the agreement in order that she might be free to marry a third
person, and that the agreement was conditioned upon a verbal understand-
ing that the husband would prosecute a divorce action if the wife would
relinquish all interest in their jointly-owned property, except certain per-
sonal property of relatively little value. Thus, under these circumstances,
the court found collusion between the parties and declared the contract
void as against public policy. However, the wife did not recover the
property because the court would aid neither party in recovering property
delivered according to the terms of such an invalid contract.1 6
Therefore, it is possible to derive two general rules from the Murray
case. First, even though an agreement is valid on its face, the parol evidence
rule will not prevent the introduction of evidence showing that the con-
tract is actually in violation of public policy. Thus, the frequently drafted
7. Johns v. McNabb, 247 S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1952).
8. Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (En Banc 1950).
9. Murray v. Murray, 293 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. 1956).
10. In re Mean's Estate, 284 S.W. 186 (Spr. Mo. App. 1926).
11. McQuate v. White, 389 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1965).
12. Johns v. Johns, 204 Mo. App. 412, 222 S.W. 492 (St. L. Ct. App. 1920);
Harrison v. Harrison, 201 Mo. App. 465, 211 S.W. 708 (K.C. Ct. App. 1919).
13. Murray v. Murray, 293 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. 1956); Farrow v. Farrow, 277
S.W.2d 532, 535 (Mo. 1955); Bloss v. Bloss, 251 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1952).
14. Rough v. Rough, 195 S.W. 501, 503 (Spr. Mo. App. 1917).
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provision to the effect that "irreconcilable disputes have -arisen, that the
parties are separated, and that a suit for divorce has been filed or is about
to be filed"17 can be contradicted by parol evidence. Second, if the invalid
agreement is executed by parties in pari delicto, the courts will aid neither
party in regaining the transferred property.
In Farrow v. Farrow,18 the plaintiff contended that an agreement
stating that the conveyance of property from husband to wife was to
take effect "if and when the divorce is granted" was collusive because
such a contingency had as its objective the dissolution of the marriage
contract. Plaintiff principally relied on Speck v. Dausman'9 which had held
that a contract between husband and wife conditioned upon a divorce
being granted was contrary to public policy. However, in Farrow the
Missouri Supreme Court held that to the extent that Speck is construed
to mean that property settlement agreements between a discordant hus-
band and wife are void if they provide that they shall not take effect until
a divorce is granted, it is overruled. From a practical standpoint, Farrow
seems to reach the best result since most separation agreements are made
in contemplation of divorce. Furthermore, public policy should not dis-
courage divorce when all legitimate objects of marriage have been frus-
trated.
The Farrow Court also held that failure to disclose the agreement's
existence to the divorce court is not necessarily collusive and will not
prevent its future specific performance. However, as will be seen, such a
disclosure is extremely important in determining whether the wife's sup-
port payments are contractual or decretal.
The Missouri courts have pinpointed three provisions in separation
agreements which may be considered collusive. In Jones v. Jones,20 it was
held that a contract specifically providing that the wife "agrees not to make
any contest" in the proposed divorce action is collusive because it would
facilitate the obtaining of a divorce by the husband. A provision providing
that the plaintiff in a divorce action prosecute his suit to final conclusion
would also be held collusive because it would foreclose opportunities for
reconciliation.2 1 It is also considered collusive for a husband to induce
his wife to sue for a divorce by promises of remuneration.2 2
B. Fairness and Fraud
Assuming that the agreement is not collusive, it will still be invalid
if not fair and equitable, and free from fraud.
In McQuate v. White,23 the latest Missouri case considering "fairness"
at length, a wife sued to set aside a separation agreement because of
unfairness. The parties had agreed that the wife could deal freely with
17. Tremayne, Separation Agreements, MissouRi FAmLY LAw 145 (1967).
18. 277 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Mo. 1955).
19. 7 Mo. App. 165 (St. L. Ct. App. 1878).
20. 325 Mo. 1037, 1042, 30 S.W.2d 49, 52 (1930). Accord, Gardine v. Cottey,
360 Mo. 681, 230 S.W.2d 731 (En Banc 1950).
21. Farrow v. Farrow, 277 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. 1955).
22. Bishop v. Bishop, 162 S.W.2d 332 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
23. 389 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1965).
[Vol. 85
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her own property which was valued at $6,000, and the husband could deal
freely with certain real estate valued at $65,000. Also, the husband re-
leased his rights in the wife's property, and the wife released her rights
and interest in the specified real estate. The court held that the agreement
was fair.24 In addition, the court stated that for an agreement to be fair
it is not necessary that the wife receive any specific part of the husband's
property, or even her share under the law of intestacy. 25 Also, if each party
releases all claims in the property of the other, the wife's property need not
be equal to that of husband.
In Speiser v. Speiser,26 a separation contract was held invalid because
it divested the wife of all interest in her husband's property without giv-
ing her anything in return. Thus, although the amount of consideration
need not be equal, it must be more than merely a nominal sum.
An example of an agreement patently unfair is found in Johns v. Mc-
Nabb.27 In that case, the wife agreed to convey her 200 acre farm to her
husband for a recited consideration of $1 and other valuable consideration.
The other consideration was the right to custody of the children on a half-
time basis when it did not interfere with their school attendance. The court
held that under such terms there was no mutual relinquishment of rights
and the agreement was invalid.
According to the above-cited cases,28 it appears that Missouri courts
will not invalidate a separation agreement for unfairness unless it is grossly
inequitable or there is, in fact, no consideration at all for the release of
rights. Any "real" consideration should be sufficient to support the agree-
ment. However, the line between overreaching and a bad settlement is
often difficult to draw, hence, under some circumstances results may be
difficult to predict. Each party should be prepared to prove that the
other was aware of the income, assets, and needs of the other.2 9 A recital
in the agreement to the effect that both parties were represented by counsel
of their choice would tend to indicate that the agreement was fair.3 0 In
addition, each party should attach a schedule of property owned at the time
of agreement in order to facilitate proof in the event of a later disagree-
ment.8 1
Although a settlement agreement seems fair it may be declared invalid
if procured by fraud.8 2 In Gardine v. Cottey,83 a wife sought to set aside
24. Id. The court noted that an agreement in which the husband permits
the wife to deal freely with her own property, by itself, affords no consideration.
However, in McQuate the husband and wife made mutual promises which the
court considered to be sufficient consideration. Accord, Hall v. Greenwell, 231
Mo. App. 1093, 85 S.W.2d 150 (St. L. Ct. App. 1935).
25. McQuate v. White, 389 S.W.2d 206, 213 (Mo. 1965).
26. 188 Mo. App. 328, 175 S.W. 122 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
27. 247 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Mo. 1952).
28. McQuate v. White, 389 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1965); Johns v. McNabb, 247
S.W.2d 640 (Mo. 1952); Speiser v. Speiser, 188 Mo. App. 328, 175 S.W. 122 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1915).
29. McQuate v. White, 389 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. 1965).
30. Beckett, Separation Agreements, 21 Mo. L. Rxv. 286, 293 (1956).
31. Id.
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a property settlement on the ground that it was the result of fraud. The
evidence established that counsel for the husband assisted the latter in
changing the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy from his wife to his
estate, and also prepared the husband's will excluding the wife. Counsel
thereafter called the wife and told her that if she filed for divorce it
would be contested and nasty publicity would result. Furthermore, he told
her that a property settlement would provide the most satisfactory results
for her. He then drafted the property settlement. The court, in finding that
the agreement was procured by fraud, concluded that counsel had im-
properly represented both parties in adverse litigation without revealing
to the wife the serious nature and effect of the transaction upon her finan-
cially.
Although fraud in the procurement of a separation agreement is de-
fined the same as fraud in the procurement of any contract, Gardine
adds a new dimension to the definition. An ethical violation by the at-
torney may be construed as a fraud upon the party harmed. Avoidance of
such an ethical problem would most easily be achieved by the wife and
husband retaining different counsel at all times during the settlement
proceedings. However, such a solution would not be practical in many in-
stances. Therefore, it is incumbent upon counsel to be impartial and dis-
close all facts to both parties throughout the settlement negotiations.
Gardine also establishes the rule that court approval of an invalid
separation agreement will not be res judicata on a subsequent suit to set it
aside. However, if the validity of the agreement is specifically ruled upon
at the initial proceeding it will be res judicata in a subsequent suit. It
would therefore be advisable in extreme situations where a high degree
of mistrust and vindictiveness is present, to have the issue of validity
decided by the lower court in order to foreclose subsequent attack. 4
III. RELATIONSHIP OF AGREEMENT TO DECREE
The most confusing aspect of separation agreements involves the re-
lationship between the agreement and the subsequent divorce decree. Mis-
souri cases are conflicting and the language employed by the courts is often
contradictory, thus making it difficult to reconcile the various cases.
Basically, the relationship of two variables creates most of the prob-
lems. (1) It is well settled under Missouri law that a wife and husband, in
contemplation of divorce and separation, may, by a valid contract between
themselves, settle and adjust all property rights growing out of the marital
relation and preclude the court from adjudicating alimony.35 (2) The court
decreeing the divorce has the power to make reasonable orders concerning
the alimony and maintenance of the wife and the custody and support of
34. However, a number of appeals court decisions indicate that what appears
to have been a routine approval gave rise to the doctrine of res judicata. Mc-
Dougal v. McDougal, 279 S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Luedde v. Luedde,
240 Mo. App. 69, 211 S.W.2d 513 (St. L. Ct. App. 1948); Poor v. Poor, 183 Mo.
App. 292, 167 S.W.2d 471 (Spr. Ct. App. 1942); Bishop v. Bishop, 162 S.W.2d
332 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
35. North v. North, 839 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936).
[Vol. 85
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the children.8 6 However, the court cannot adjudicate a division of assets be-
tween the parties.87
Often the conflict created by these variables gives rise to many prob-
lems. For example, under what circumstances will court approval or decree
of the terms of a separation agreement not result in a decree enforceable
and modifiable as statutory alimony? In the alternative, when will the con-
tract terms become part of the decree, hence enforceable and modifiable as
statutory alimony? When in fact would the separation agreement become a
part of the decree? Hopefully, these and other questions will be answered
by this comment.
A. Support of the Wife
In Missouri the starting point with respect to the enforceability and
modifiability of the wife's support provisions is the case of North v. North.
33
In that case the wife obtained a decree of divorce from her husband and an
award of alimony of $500 per month so long as she remained unmarried.
On the same day the petition was filed, she and her husband had entered
into a written contract adjusting all property rights, in which the husband
agreed to pay the wife $500 a month until her death or remarriage. The
contract provided that in consideration of the above provision, the wife
released the husband from any obligation to pay alimony, support or main-
tenance, and relinquished all claims against his property arising out of the
marital relation, including dower, alimony, and support. Later, the husband
filed a motion to modify the alimony award because of changed financial
conditions.3 9 The Supreme Court held that a court has no authority to
modify contractual provisions made by the parties in lieu of alimony, when,
as in this case, the decree on its face shows that the award is not an award
of statutory alimony.
In North the Missouri Supreme Court established several basic proposi-
tions upon which subsequent case law relies. Section 452.070, RSMo 1969
permits modification of an award of alimony but does not authorize the
modification of a legal contractual obligation. Therefore, the issue to be
decided is whether the allowance ($500 per month in North) is statutory
alimony, which can be modified, or whether it is a contractual obligation,
which cannot be modified.
The court considered several factors in holding that the decree can-
not be modified. First, the provision in the decree awarding the wife $500
per month so long as she remained unmarried (the same as that provided
in the contract between the parties) indicates that the decree was an "ap-
proval" of the contract and not an award of alimony, since the court has
no authority to make an award of alimony which may continue, beyond
86. § 452.070, RSMo 1969.
37. McDougal v. McDougal, 279 S.W.2d 781 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955). But see
Lane v. Lane, 439 S.W.2d 550 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969).
38. 839 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1986).
89. For a thorough discussion of the "change in circumstances" rule in
regard to modification of a final judgment, see Smalley, Modification of Divorce
Decrees, MwSSouiU FA?"Ly LAw, 286-9 (1967).
1970]
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the husband's death,40 but is does have authority to approve a contract
containing such a provision. Thus, if the wife's allowance in the decree
is the result of a previous agreement between the parties and does not fall
within the accepted definition of alimony,41 so that it would have been
impossible for the court to have awarded it as statutory alimony, then,
notwithstanding the parties and even the court calling it "alimony," the
allowance for the wife in the decree will not be construed as statutory
alimony.42
The second point made by the court was that where a separation
agreement is free from fraud and collusion and is fair to the wife, the courts
have no right to disregard it. This language seems to be predicated upon
the assumption that the agreement will be filed with the court or offered
into evidence at the trial. In such a situation it seems that a valid agree-
ment for the support of the wife in lieu of alimony must be followed by
the court if the parties so provided. It is submitted, therefore, that even
if the provisions of the agreement are within the court's statutory authority,
the court cannot disregard the agreement. Furthermore, the fact that the
court decree is the same as a conclusive agreement does not convert such
provision for support into statutory alimony.
The third point in North is that if the property settlement approved
by the court represents a lawful and all-inclusive settlement of the affairs
of the parties, it will be presumed that the award is support in lieu of
alimony and not modifiable. Hence, it seems that, according to North,
provisions for support of the wife will not be subjected to modification if:
(1) the judgment by its terms exceeds the statutory authority; or (2) the
settlement is lawful and disposes of all the parties' property.
In Chappell v. Nash,4 3 the Kansas City Court of Appeals adds to some
of the basic tenets set out in North. The Chappell court states that in de-
termining whether a decree is statutory alimony or support in lieu
of alimony, one must consider whether the separation agreement provisions
were merely "suggestions" to the divorce court or were submitted to the
court as conclusive. This issue becomes especially important when neither
of the North tests are statisfied, i.e., if the agreement fails to deal with
all the parties' property and its terms are within the court's authority.
If the North tests are not satisfied and the contract is considered merely
a suggestion, the court's award will be construed as statutory alimony and
40. Smethers v. Smethers, 263 S.W.2d 60 (K.C. Mo. App. 1953).
41. Id.
42. The decisions of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Edmonson v.
Edmonson, 242 S.W.2d 730 (K.C. Mo. App. 1951) and Chappell v. Nash, 399
S.W.2d 253 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965) are in accord with this interpretation. Thus,
where a divorce court purports to decree provisions of a separation agreement
which would otherwise be beyond the court's authority, such provisions are "made
without authority of law and are void." Edmonson v. Edmonson, 242 S.W.2d 730,
786 (K.C. Mo. App. 1951). However, in Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1964), the St. Louis Court of Appeals seems to assume a contrary
position. There the court seems to say that matters outside the court's original
authority, if consented to by the parties in their agreement and if the agreement
is filed, approved by the court, and made a part of the decree, become a part of
the judgment and are merged into the decree.
43. 399 S.W.2d 253 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
[Vol. 35
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therefore modifiable. The distinction is best explained by the following
language:
Where the parties agree to alimony and then ask the Court to
exercise its discretion by granting to the wife the amount agreed
upon, such an agreement does not represent an agreement settling
their property rights, but represents an award of statutory
alimony.44
If it is desired that the agreement be something more than a sugges-
tion, it should be either filed with the court or offered into evidence, or
the court should be requested to incorporate the applicable provisions
verbatim into the decree.45 Also the agreement itself should not contain
language invoking the discretion of the court nor language which could
be construed as merely suggestive. However, as pointed out in Part IV,
statutory alimony would provide the best results for the parties under cer-
tain circumstances, in which case suggestive language should be used in
the agreement.
An agreement construed as conclusive on the subject of alimony rather
than suggestive is found in Singer v. Singer.46 (1) The agreement was en-
titled "Agreement for Property Settlement." This is an indication that
all property rights will be settled and that the agreement is more than
merely suggestive. (2) There was a clause in the agreement to the effect
that:
[I]n the event the aforementioned Court shall, upon the trial of
the said suit, make and enter its decree therein, granting plaintiff
a divorce from the bonds of matrimony, then the settlement here-
inafter provided to be made shall at once take effect as an agree-
ment binding the parties with reference to the rights and obliga-
tions of each party as the spouse of the other, and with reference
to all marital and other rights of either in and to the property and
estate of the other party, whether real, personal or mixed, and
wherever situated.47
(3) There was also a clause directing the court to adopt the provisions
of the agreement. E.g., "Any decree of divorce entered in this matter shall
provide, etc." 48
(4) There was also a provision reciting the intentions of the parties in-
volved, e.g., It is the intention of all the parties hereto by this contract to
adjust all property rights which said parties may have, and to fully and
finally adjust all claims, present or in the future, for support money and
alimony, if any, and such settlement shall be considered final as between
said parties as to any claim which each may have against the other . . .
and the execution of this contract shall be a final and full release of any
and all claims which either party may now or thereafter have against the
other.49
44. Id. at 256.
45. Chappell v. Nash, 399 S.W.2d 253 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965).
46. 890 S.W.2d 605 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
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If an agreement containing the above terms is found to be fair, equit-
able, and free from collusion, it should be considered conclusive and the
courts should not be allowed to disregard it. If the above result is desired,
in addition the parties should request that the court show in its decree
that it adopts the separation agreement. The best means of accomplishing
this is to incorporate the agreement verbatim into the decree. It has been
held that in such a case there can be no doubt about the court's adoption
of the agreement. 50 However, even if the agreement is not set out in full,
some other act of the court could show its adoption of the agreement. For
example, where the trial court refers to the agreement and indicates ap-
proval of it, it was held that the court adopted the agreement.5 1 The
indication or recital usually found in the decree is that the agreement
has been "filed and approved." 52
The cases cited thus far have held that the support provisions were
support in lieu of alimony, rather than statutory alimony. However, there
are several cases which have held payments to be statutory alimony even
though a separation agreement was in existence. A consideration of these
cases and the grounds upon which modification of the decree was per-
mitted may be helpful in obtaining a complete understanding of the various
factors upon which the courts rely. i
In Alverson v. Alverson,53 a divorced wife sued to modify an alimony
decree. Prior to the divorce hearing the parties had prepared a written
stipulation in which it was agreed, "subject to the approval of the court,"
that, in the event the court granted a divorce to the wife, "party defendant
is to pay the party plaintiff, as and for alimony, the sum of one hundred
dollars ($100) each month .. ."54 The stipulation was filed at trial. The
divorce decree included the stipulation in full and decreed $100 per month
as alimony, until further order of the court (the inclusion of the latter
phrase admittedly being a mistake of the clerk). On these facts, the St.
Louis Court of Appeals permitted modification.
The court enumerated the following reasons as the basis for construing
the payments as statutory alimony: (1) The issue of alimony was raised
by the pleadings, indicating that the parties had at least originally intended
that the court decide the question of alimony. (2) The instrument filed
in court was designated, not a contract, but a "stipulation." (8) There was
no adjustment of all property rights growing out of the marital relation.
(4) The court would have been fully authorized to make such an allowance
to the wife in the absence of any stipulation. (5) In drawing the stipulation,
the parties identified the sum the husband was to pay as being "as and
for alimony," and the court, in its decree, employed identical language.
(6) The court, absent objection from the parties, provided that in the
event of default on any of the installments, "execution issue therefor."5 5
The court felt that although none of these reasons alone was enough to
50. Singer v. Singer, 390 S.W.2d 605 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
51. Tracy v. Tracy, 205 S.W.2d 947 (St. L. Mo. App. 1947).
52. Singer v. Singer, 890 S.W.2d 605, 607 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
53. 249 S.W.2d 472 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
54. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 475-76.
[Vol. 35
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permit modification, taken as a whole, they indicated that the "stipulation"
was intended as merely a suggestion to the court.
It is submitted that Alverson was incorrectly decided and is not good
authority today, although it has not been expressly overruled. The fact
that the issue of alimony was raised in the pleadings, although ordinarily
significant, should not have been entitled to much weight in Alverson
because the "stipulation" was made after the suit was filed. The fact that
the instrument was called a "stipulation" rather than a contract is insig-
nificant since attention should be focused on the actual content of the
agreement. The fact that the "stipulation" was not a settlement of all
property rights and covered matters within the court's authority are not
reasons upon which to find a settlement merely suggestive. Although
the presence of these two factors is to be considered conclusive according
to North, their absence should not be construed as indicating that the
parties intended the settlement simply as a suggestion to the court. Further-
more, the court's reasoning concerning the use of the word "alimony"
in the "stipulation" is directly in conflict with North, where the court
said that, notwithstanding the parties' and even the court's calling the
payments "alimony," the allowance should be construed as contractual.
In other words, no particular meaning should be attached to the word
"alimony" other than that gained in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Although the sixth reason given by the court (the decree provided for
execution) is valid, this factor alone cannot support the result reached in
Alverson. This is especially true in light of the rule laid down in North
that court adoption of the provisions of a settlement agreement does not
necessarily convert contractual payments to statutory alimony. The result
in Alverson is particularly untenable in light of the fact that the "stipula-
tion" was quoted verbatim in the decree. In Chappell, it should be recalled,
the court held such a recital conclusive as to the issue of whether the
contract is merely a suggestion.
The one lesson, however, that can be -learned from Alverson is that
ambiguity in either the decree or the agreement can sometimes cause un-
intended results. Therefore, it is imperative that great care be taken in
the preparation of the agreement and in advising the court as to the lan-
guage to be included in the decree.
Excluding cases involving agreements clearly intended to be suggestive,
there are three cases in Missouri in addition to Alverson construing sup-
port allowance to a wife as statutory alimony despite the existence of a
prior separation agreement, 56 the most recent and revealing of which is
56. Gunnerson v. Gunnerson, 379 S.W.2d 861 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964); Wesson
v. Wesson, 271 S.W.2d 214 (St. L. Mo. App. 1954); Moser v. Moser, 235 Mo. App.
784, 148 S.W.2d 71 (K.C. Ct. App. 1941).
In Moser a divorced husband's motion to modify a decree of alimony was
resisted by his former wife on the ground that the judgment was only an
affirmance of the contract. In view of the fact that no stipulation or writing
concerning a property settlement had been introduced in evidence at the divorce
trial, or filed with the court, or shown to the court, the court held, "[U]nder
such circumstances, we do not see how it could be said that the court in
entering judgment was approving a property settlement between the parties in
accordance with a definite and specific contract which they had entered into."
Moser v. Moser, 235 Mo. App. at 786, 148 S.W.2d at 72.
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Gunnerson v. Gunnerson.57 In that case, a wife, who had prayed for alimony
in her divorce petition and at trial, was not permitted to obtain specific
performance of the support provisions of the pre-existing settlement agree-
ment. The court named several factors upon which it based its conclusion:
(1) At the hearing the "property settlement agreement" was not introduced
in evidence, marked as an exhibit, or brought to the attention of the court
in any manner. If contractual support is desired it is impossible to over-
come such a defect because the court cannot possibly approve an agree-
ment it hasn't seen. Therefore, in such a case the decree must be modifi-
able statutory alimony. (2) The decree provided for execution, should
the husband default in his payments, thus indicating that the payments
were statutory alimony. (3) The wife's actions at the divorce trial indicated
her intention to obtain a judgment for alimony. She prayed for alimony in
her petition, and at the trial she specifically asked for an alimony allow-
ance in an amount appearing reasonable in light of the evidence. (4)
For four years the wife accepted the allowance adjudged by the court.
This is a type of laches argument. (5) She further recognized the judgment
and utilized its provisions by exercising the right of execution contained
within it.58 The above reasons are sound, and demonstrate the factors point-
ing toward a determination of statutory alimony.
The Gunnerson court also determined the effect of a decree of statutory
alimony upon a prior contract. The contract claim for support money is
merged into the decree and at least those parts of the contract covered in
the decree become unenforceable. 59
Where the plaintiff has obtained a valid and final personal judg-
ment against the defendant for the payment of money, the original
claim is extinguished and is merged in the judgment. If the plain-
tiff thereafter brings an action on the original cause of action, the
defendant can set up the judgment as a defense.60
In Wesson the court reached the same result, stating that no single factor
was controlling, but that the property settlement as a whole, the circumstances
under which it was made, the nature and value of the property to be divided,
and the language of the decree were to be considered. The court stressed the
fact that the "plaintiff sought and the court issued an execution upon thejudgment to enforce payment of the obligation." Wesson v. Wesson, supra, at 217.
57. 379 S.W.2d 861 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
58. Id. at 865-67.
59. This is true of a provision for the support of the wife. But, query:
where a provision for a division of assets is contained in a separation agreement
and the agreement is not filed with the court, is such a provision unenforceable?
It is submitted that such a provision should remain enforceable because there is
nothing in the decree which would preempt it. This is because a court in a
divorce case has no original authority to adjudicate a division of the parties'
assets. § 452.070, RSMo 1969.
On the other hand, where a provision for a division of assets is contained
in a separation agreement and the agreement is filed and approved by the court,
has the court entered a judgment dividing the assets or has it merely approved
the contract? The latter would seem to be the rule. See Chappell v. Nash, 399
S.W.2d 253 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965); Edmonson v. Edmonson, 242 S.W.2d 730 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1951). But see Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965);
McDougal v. McDougal, 279 S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); and Bishop v.
Bishop, 151 S.W.2d 553 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
60. 379 S.W.2d 861, 867 (K.C. Mo. App. 1964).
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If merger is desired, the use of a short stipulation by the parties, em-
bodying only those provisions which are to be suggestions for the court
to consider in the exercise of its discretion, is preferable to filing the
entire separation agreement which may contain many non-adjudicable
matters.
It seems therefore, that the problems created in this area are a result
of ambiguous contracts, ambiguous pleadings, and ambiguous language in
divorce decrees. Clarity in all of the above would alleviate many of the
difficulties that have arisen. Unfortunately, the client will often consult a
lawyer only after the ambiguity has already occurred. In such a case, the
only approach is to attempt to salvage as much as possible from the dam-
age already done. Hopefully, a knowledge of the above factors as consid-
ered by the courts will be helpful in alleviating the harm.61
B. Child Support and Custody62
It is well settled that the courts may disregard provisions of a separa-
tion agreement that affect the future support and custody of children.6 3
Thus, the parties cannot deprive the courts of their inherent power to
provide for the support and custody of minor children as their welfare
requires.64 The court may, however, adopt the amount agreed upon and
the custodial provisions of the agreement by incorporating them into the
decree. In such a case the court retains the power to modify the decree
when it becomes apparent that new and changed conditions make such
a modification necessary. The policy underlying this rule is that the welfare
of the child is paramount and cannot be affected by an agreement between
the parents.
There is an important distinction between past support payments
and future support payments. In a dispute over past payments for sup-
port of children committed to the mother by the court, such payments
being in the nature of a debt owed to the mother by the husband, the
husband and wife may make a contract binding upon the wife in any
action at law to recover for such past support.6 5 However, as to payments
for future support of minor children, which can be affected only, by a
proceeding to modify the divorce decree, neither mother, nor father, nor
both, have any power by contract or agreement to control the court's
action.66
If suggestions regarding future child support and custody are reason-
61. Although the tax aspects regarding support payments to the wife are
not within the scope of this comment, they are extremely important in drafting
a separation agreement. Under Section 71 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, the tax treatment of support payments is exactly the same whether the wife
is divorced or legally separated from her husband under court decree, or if the
wife is separated from her husband and there is a written separation agreement.
62. See Tremayne, Separation Agreements, Missouas FAmLY LAw 154-60
(1967).
63. Jenks v. Jenks, 385 S.W.2d 370 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
64. § 452.070, RSMo 1969.
65. LaRue v. Kempf, 186 Mo. App. 57, 171 S.W. 588 (St. L. Ct. App. 1914).
66. Jenks v. Jenks, 885 S.W.2d 370 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965).
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able, they will probably be adopted by the court.67 This is especially true
if the agreement has been recently executed and deals extensively with the
rights and obligations of the husband and wife.68 In such a situation it is
assumed that the parties gave some consideration to their needs and the
future needs of the children at the time the agreement was executed.69
Thus, the agreement itself becomes evidence of what the parties consider
reasonable 70 Hence, in light of the court's readiness to adopt an agreement
which is "reasonable," the agreement itself can play a major role in de-
termining the future obligations of the parties. Although the court can
disregard the agreement, the parties can, in effect, provide provisions which
they desire to be in the divorce decree.
In regard to child support, there are several devices available to ob-
tain a more satisfactory result for both the husband and wife. The pri-
mary duty to support the children of the marriage rests on the husband,7 1
and it is not altered by the dissolution of the marriage. Furthermore, this
is true even where the decree contains no provision for child support.72
Thus, the father cannot contract away his obligation of child support.7 3
However, the father can fulfill this obligation in a variety of ways, each
of which is presentable to the court in a separation agreement.
One of the most important factors in drafting the child support provi-
sions of a separation agreement is the tax considerations involved. Child
support payments stated separately from alimony are not deductible by the
husband nor taxable as income to the wife.7 4 However, if no specific amount
is designated as child support and the payments to the wife are intended
to meet the needs of both the wife and the child, the entire amount will
be treated as alimony, deductible by the husband and taxable to the
wife.75 Thus, it would appear desirable for the husband to specify in the
agreement an amount which meets the needs of both the wife and child
and call it "alimony" or "support in lieu of alimony." This approach is
especially attractive if the husband is in a high tax bracket and the wife
is not. However, the creation of one sum for both alimony and child
support may give rise to certain problems. Since it is impossible to deter-
mine what part of the payment is alimony and what part is child support,
the court, due to changed circumstances and as a result of its continuing
jurisdiction over the child's welfare may decide to modify the entire sum.7 6
If separate sums are created, the court cannot modify the "alimony,"
assuming it was contractual. Therefore, in each case the tax savings should
be weighed against the possibilities of modification.
67. Reasonableness, in this regard, means in accordance with the financial
ability of the father and the needs of the children.
68. Houston v. Snyder, 440 S.W.2d 156 (Spr. Mo. App. 1969).
69. Id. at 159.
70. Id. at 160.
71. Smith v. Smith, 800 S.W.2d 275 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957); Roberts v.
Roberts, 292 S.W.2d 596 (Spr. Mo. App. 1956).
72. Hunter v. Schwertfeger, 407 S.W.2d 606 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Bern-
stein v. Bernstein, 351 S.W.2d 46 (K.C. Mo. App. 1961).
73. Messmer v. Messmer, 222 S.W.2d 521 (St. L. Mo. App. 1949).
74. INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 71 (b).
75. Comm'r. v. Lester, 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
76. Maxey v. Maxey, 203 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. 1947).
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There is another problem created by the use of one sum to cover
both "alimony" and child support. Ordinarily, the husband is entitled to a
reduction in payments of child support when the child reaches majority,77
but with "alimony" and child support combined the husband cannot be
assured of such a reduction.78 Therefore, in such a case there should be
a specific provision in the agreement stating that upon the child's majority
a reduction in payments to the wife shall occur. This provision should
iefer to each child separately because it has been held that a support award
to children collectively will not be reduced as each child reaches majority.79
One other consideration must be kept in mind in determining whether
payments intended for child support should be specifically designated. If
the parties decide to combine child support payments with alimony pay-
ments, the husband will get a deduction for the full amount as "alimony,"
but cannot claim a part of the payments as child support for the purpose
of determining which spouse gets an exemption for the child.80 Generally
speaking, the exemption is awarded to that parent who has had custody
of a particular child for the greater portion of the year. This general rule
is followed by two important exceptions. First, the non-custodial parent is
entitled to the exemption if he contributes at least $600 towards the sup-
port of the child and the decree of divorce or a written separation agree-
ment between the parties, specifies that he is to receive the exemption. Al-
ternatively, if the non-custodial parent provides at least $1,200 of child
support (regardless of the number of children) then he is prima facie en-
titled to the exemption unless the custodial parent can "clearly establish"
that she contributed more toward the support of the child or children
than the non-custodial parent.8 ' Thus, a husband will have to balance
the advantages of a deduction for the child support payment against the
possibility of a dependency exemption.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF STATUTORY ALIMONY AND
SUPPORT IN LIEu OF ALIMONY 8 2
Part III considered the factors upon which Missouri courts rely in
determining whether support payments to the wife are contractual support
in lieu of alimony or statutory alimony. This determination is important
because different consequences follow one choice as compared with the
other.
A judgment of statutory alimony can be modified according to the
changed needs and financial positions of the parties,8 3 but a valid con-
tract for support in lieu of alimony may not be modified by the court.8 4
77. Gordon v. Ary, 358 S.W.2d 81, 84 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
78. Tremayne, Separation Agreements, MissouRI FAMILY LAw 155 (1967).
79. Gordon v. Ary, 358 S.W.2d 81 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
80. This also includes deductible medical expenses.
81. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 152 (a).
82. The consequences of statutory alimony and support in lieu of alimony
were obtained from Tremayne, Separation Agreements, Missoru FAMLY LAW
147-48 (1967).
83. § 452.070, RSMo 1959. "The court, on the application of either party,
may make such alteration, from time to time, as to the allowance of alimony and
maintenance, as may be proper...."
84. North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936).
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Since modification of the provisions of a decree is viewed as an extension
of the court's initial jurisdiction, there is no need for personal service of
summons upon the defendant or plaintiff within the jurisdiction of the
court.8 5 It is also possible by contract to provide that the payments to
the wife are to remain constant for a specified period of time, after which
they are to be subject to modification.8 6 If such a result is desired it would
be best to obtain statutory alimony and provide in the court approved
separation agreement that neither party will seek modification for a spec-
ified period of time.
A wife entitled to support payments resulting from a decree awarding
her statutory alimony, becomes a judgment creditor of her husband and,
as such, she is entitled to all remedies afforded to judgment creditors after
default of the judgment debtor.87 Failure to comply with a contractual
provision for support in lieu of alimony requires a new suit on the contract
and new service of process. Payments due under a contract are like monies
due on account or an installment contract in which case a new judgment
is necessary for each periodic default. On the other hand, payments which
are in default as a result of a statutory alimony decree are under the judg-
ment automatically as they come due and execution can issue summarily.
However, if the separation agreement is approved by the court and
incorporated into the decree, it should be enforceable under the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 8 even though the support pro-
visions remain contractual. In State ex rel. Watley v. Mueller,s 9 the ex-
wife, a Pennsylvania resident, was seeking accrued child support payments
due her under a separation agreement. The parties had been divorced in
a Florida court and the defendant subsequently became a Missouri resident.
The suit was based upon the Pennsylvania Uniform Enforcement Act90
which is identical to the Missouri Act.9 ' The Florida court had "[O]rdered,
Adjudged and Decreed that both plaintiff and defendant carry out the
terms of the separation agreement entered into by the parties ... (the
original of which has been introduced into evidence as Plaintiff's exhibit
1 and attached to the transcript of testimony) which this court does
hereby approve." The defendant argued that the divorce decree did not
order him to make any support payments to the wife or their children
and that plaintiff had no court order, judgment or decree requiring him to
make any payments to her. The problem before the court was whether the
divorce decree was sufficiently final and complete so that the parties
could tell with reasonable certainty the extent to which the rights were
fixed. The court held that the judgment was sufficient to impose a duty
of child support as contemplated by the Uniform Act, either on the
theory that the separation agreement, which was filed in the divorce
85. Greene v. Greene, 368 S.W.2d 426 (Mo. 1963).
86. Tremayne, Separation Agreements, Missouvi, FAmLY LAw 166, Form 9.1
A: § 452.070, RSMo 1969.
88, §§ 454.010 to 454.360, RSMo 1969.
89. 288 S.W.2d 405 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
90. 62 P.S. PA. §§ 2043.1-.27.
91. §§ 454.010 to 454.360, RSMo 1969.
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court with the pleadings, could be referred to, or on the theory that the
agreement was incorporated by reference in the divorce decree.
Although Watley involved child support payments over which a
court has continuing jurisdiction, it is submitted that the same result should
follow with respect to payments due a wife which are contractual but in-
corporated into the divorce decree. Section 454.020, RSMo 1969 defines
duty of support as including:
[A]ny duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or any court
order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate
maintenance or otherwise.92
Since the act is liberally construed because it is remedial,93 the above pro-
vision could certainly be construed to include a separation agreement
whose terms have been court approved and incorporated into the court
record, e.g., a decree which adopts a separation agreement clearly indicat-
ing that the parties intend the support payments to the wife to be
support in lieu of alimony and unmodifiable. In effect, the separation
agreement would become part of the judgment although it retained its
contractual nature. This same analysis could be applied to a separation
agreement which is not court approved. There is no Missouri case on point,
however.
Payments due under a judgment for alimony become a lien on the
husband's real estate.94 A contractual claim will not become a lien until
reduced to judgment.
There is no difference between contractual support and statutory
alimony with respect to the Federal Bankruptcy Act. Under either ap-
proach the payment obligation will not be erased by a discharge in bank-
ruptcy.95
No exemption from execution for a head of a family is available
against a judgment for statutory alimony.9 6 Although there is no Missouri
case in point, it would seem that contractual support in lieu of alimony
would be exempt from execution since section 452.140, RSMo 1969 refers
specifically to a "decree of alimony." Thus, a husband who defaults in sup-
port payments due his wife under a decree of statutory alimony will not be
able to protect any property from execution. However, if the payments are
based upon contract he should be able to have certain property exempt.
By contract, the support payments can be made to survive the hus-
band's death, the wife's remarriage, and even the wife's death.9T A judgment
for alimony terminates on any of the above events.98
92. This provision in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
is the same as § 454.020, RSMo under the pnor Uniform Support of Dependents
Law which was repealed in 1959.
93. State ex rel. Watley v. Mueller, 288 S.W.2d 405, 409 (St. L. Mo. App.
1956).
94. § 452.080, RSMo 1969.
95. 11 U.S.C. §35 (1938).
96. § 452.140, RSMo 1969.
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Whether to use statutory alimony or support in lieu of alimony will
depend upon the specific facts which confront the attorney and the party
he represents. Application of the foregoing consequences should provide
the criteria upon which the determination is made.
V. CONCLUSION '
The cases discussed in this comment indicate that the courts have not
evolved a coherent and rational approach to the various problems posed
by separation agreements. This observation is especially valid with respect
to the relationship between the divorce decree and the separation agreement.
It is submitted that the courts should, of course, retain ultimate au-
thority over child support, child custody, and the validity of the agreement
itself. However, as long as the agreement presented to the court is fair
and not collusive, it should ordinarily be conclusive as to all future rights
and obligations of the parties other than child support and custody. Often
the wife and occasionally the husband desire statutory alimony because
of the beneficial consequences which inure. In such a situation, the agree-
ment should either specifically state that statutory alimony is desired or
leave the determination of support payments to the wife in the discretion
of the court.
Thus, the separation agreement can benefit both husband and wife
in obtaining desirable results in accordance with their special situation.
It can define with particularity the various rights and obligations of the
parties. It can broaden or restrict the court's authority in a manner desired
by the parties. Most of all, it can assist in terminating an unsuccessful
marriage by creating a "working truce" in the lawyer's office rather than in
the court room.
In formulating a better position, it is submitted that the courts should
encourage the solution of marital difficulties, by agreement rather than by
recourse to the courts.
Litigation means delay, expense, bitterness, almost always undesir-
able publicity, and sometimes open scandal. Settlement by contract
is swift, inexpensive, decent and private. If an attorney finds that
a husband and wife are irreconcilably estranged, he should as a
matter of social duty and professional ethics, not only counsel but
earnestly urge settlement by agreement. 99
i IRWIN E. BLOND
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